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The Materiality Concept: 
Implications for Managers  
and Investors 
ABSTRACT
Discuss the implications of materiality of financial information on 
“earnings management”. Imply the content description and analysis of FASB 
Accounting Standards Codification™. The Professional View is used to confirm 
the absence of materiality guidelines in the US GAAP. Materiality, importance 
and significance are terms used to indicate the materiality consideration in 
the Codifications. The main conclusions are concerned to, first, the internal 
and external determinants and motives influence the practices of “earnings 
managements”, and second US GAAP do not offer well defined guidelines to 
apply materiality on decision making.
Keywords: Accounts Manipulation, Earnings Management, Materiality, 
and Financial Statements.
JEL: M00, M4
El concepto de materialidad:  
implicaciones para gerentes e inversionistas
RESUMEN
Se discuten las implicaciones de la materialidad de la información 
financiera sobre “manejo de los ingresos”. Implica la descripción y el análisis 
del contenido de la Codificación de Normas Contables™. Las perspectivas 
profesionales fueron utilizadas para confirmar la ausencia de directrices de 
importancia relativa en los Principios de Contabilidad Generalmente Aceptados 
(en inglés, PCGA) de los EE. UU. Los términos “materialidad”, “significancia” e 
“importancia” fueron usados para determinar la inclusión de materialidad en las 
codificaciones. Las principales conclusiones indican que, primero, los factores 
determinantes y las motivaciones internas y externas influyen en las prácticas 
de “manejos de ganancias” y, segundo, los PCGA de EE. UU. no cuentan con 
directrices bien definidas para aplicar la materialidad en la toma de decisiones. 
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O conceito de materialidade:  
implicações para os gerentes e investidores
RESUMO
Discutem-se as implicações da materialidade da informação financeira 
sobre “gestão de ganhos”. Implica a descrição e a análise do conteúdo da Codi-
ficação de Normas Contáveis™. As perspectivas profissionais foram utilizadas 
para confirmar a ausência de diretrizes de importância relativa nos Princípios 
de Contabilidade Geralmente Aceitos (em inglês, GAAP) dos Estados Unidos 
da América (EUA). Os termos “materialidade”, “significância” e “importância” 
foram usados para determinar a inclusão de materialidade nas codificações. As 
principais conclusões indicam que, primeiramente, os fatores determinantes 
e as motivações internas e externas influenciaram nas práticas de “gestão de 
ganhos” e, segundo, os PCGA dos EUA não contam com diretrizes bem defi-
nidas para aplicar a materialidade na tomada de decisões.
Palavras-chave: Manipulação de contas, gestão de ganhos, materiali-
dade, estados financeiros.
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INTRODUCTION
The current global financial crisis has influenced 
the investors’ perceptions on the evaluation of 
companies’ released information. The corporate’ 
financial problems and scandals have increased 
and the financial problems are related to the ma-
nipulation of financial information (Elias, 2004, 
Chen et al., 2005, Noronha et al., 2008). The 
accountants’ practices, in particular estimation of 
financial information and evaluating the materiality 
of the information to be included in the financial 
statements, are important to add an additional 
element to explain the relationship between the 
global financial crisis and earnings management. 
The differences between firms/auditors conside-
rations and classifications of material information 
influence earning management and that in turn 
contribute to the financial crisis.
The concept of materiality is referred to the 
magnitude of an omission or misstatement of ac-
counting information that probably influences the 
users of the financial statements (FASB Concepts 
Statement No. 2, 1980).
Accountants frequently use estimations to 
prepare financial reports. Different estimations 
make the comparability of financial data within 
or between companies very difficult task for the 
users of the financial statements. The materiality 
considerations are important for accountants’ es-
timations. The application of materiality concept 
varies between accountants. Materiality applica-
tions influence the financial statements users with 
respect to the differentiation between “accounts 
manipulation” and “earnings management”. A 
significant aspect of manipulations is the desire to 
smooth (maximize or minimize) reported income 
(Stolowy and Breton, 2003; Moore, 1973; Noronha 
et al., 2008).
In linking the materiality implications on accoun-
tants’ decision making that involves earnings manage-
ments and the fairness of companies’ information, the 
remaining of the article is organized as follows: the fo-
llowing section presents the differentiations between 
accounts manipulation and earnings management. 
Second, perceptions, and motives for earnings mana-
gement are discussed. Third, the aspects of auditing 
and regulatory enforcement controls are presented. 
Fourth, the relation between US GAAP and materiality 
concept is discussed and finally the main conclusions 
are included. 
ACCOUNTS MANIPULATION AND 
EARNINGS MANAGEMENT
Accounts manipulation is defined as the discretion 
of managers to make accounting choices or to 
design transactions affecting the possibilities of 
transferring wealth between the company and 
the society (political costs), funds providers (cost 
of capital) or managers (compensation plans). In 
the first two cases, the firms may obtain benefits 
from the wealth transfer. In the third, managers 
are acting against the firms’ interests (Stolowy and 
Breton, 2003). 
The activities covered by the term “earnings 
management” normally remain within the law 
boundaries. Earnings manipulation activities ex-
ceeded from legitimate/legal activities to fraud 
or violating GAAP, with the intention to mislead 
some stakeholders about underlying economics 
and performance of a company. The terms of ac-
counts manipulation and earnings management 
are differentiated based on the law’s boundaries 
(Noronha et al., 2008).
Earnings management definitions also relate 
to the accounting guides: earnings management 
is the presentation of accounting numbers within 
scope of the GAAP. Creative accounting is defined 
as the process of intentionally exploiting the GAAP 
or the law to present financial statements accor-
ding to the managements’ interests, and to achieve 
a desired level of reported earnings”. The earnings 
management activities are seen as a continuum of 
purposeful interventions in the external financial 
reporting process from legitimate activities (Bara-
lexis, 2004; Koumanakos et al., 2005; Guang et al., 
2006; Noronha et al., 2008).In the following table, 
examples of earnings management and earnings 
manipulation/fraud are presented.
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PERCEPTIONS AND MOTIVES OF 
EARNINGS MANAGEMENT
Accounting academics have different perception 
of earnings management than do practitioners 
and regulators. The managerial incentives created 
by compensation contracts, regulatory motivates, 
capital market motivates etc. lead to earning ma-
nagement (Elias, 2004; Healy, 1985; Gaver et al., 
1995; Noronha et al., 2008; Healy and Wahlen, 
1998; Reverte, 2008).
Revealing relevant information is crucial for 
investors to evaluate a company’s financial position 
(Fischer and Rozenweig, 1995; Sevin and Schroeder, 
2005). How to perceive events as earnings mana-
gement or earnings manipulation are important 
issues for investors (Chen et al., 2005). The share 
prices may reflect a risk premium that is associated 
with earnings variability. Managers can reduce the 
cost of capital and increase share prices by reducing 
earnings variability (Kanagaretnam et al., 2004).
The cases of earnings manipulation increa-
se over years and refocus the attention on the 
manipulations of financial statements’ content. 
It is noted that unethical earnings management 
behavior can be attributed to the failure of cor-
porate ethics. The firm’s ethical values contribute 
to the development of earnings management and 
manipulation behaviors. 
The corporate ethical values are important 
determinants of earnings management perception. 
CPAs employed in organizations with high ethical 
values were more likely to view earnings mana-
Table 1. 
Earning management versus Earning Manipulation/Fraud
































Source: Adopted from Baralexis, 2004; Koumanakos et al., 2005; Guang et al., 2006; Noronha et al., 2008.
gement actions as unethical compared to CPAs in 
organizations with low values. In industry, CPAs view 
their organizations to have significantly lower ethical 
values compared to CPAs in public accounting and 
academia (Elias, 2004, Levitt, 1998). 
There is no clear consensus in the accounting 
profession regarding their ethical acceptability of 
earning management. The debate on ethical accep-
tability of earnings management actions intensified 
after the revelation of their negative consequences 
on the fairness of the financial statements (Dechow 
and Skinner, 2000).
CEO wealth sensitivity is positively associated 
with abnormal accrual usage and the relation is 
consistent with income smoothing (Weber, 2006). 
Performance expectation is important in conduc-
ting an audit because people try to validate their 
perceptions of reality no matter if they perceive an 
event incorrectly. Performance evaluation depends 
on the perceptual process and the performance 
expectations.
ENFORCEMENT POWERS
Reforms set forth in Sarbanes Oxley (SOX) and the 
NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ are designed to prevent 
the reoccurrence of corporate collapses at compa-
nies such as Enron Corp., WorldCom Inc., Ahold, and 
Global Crossing Ltd (Kanagaretnam et al., 2004).
The considerable amount of regulatory 
attention given to corporate governance issues 
in recent years suggests that stronger gover-
nance mechanisms would reduce opportunistic 
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management behavior, thus improving the quality 
and reliability of financial reporting. Regulators 
believe that this in turn will help to maintain and 
enhance investors’ confidence in the integrity of 
capital markets (Niu, 2006).
The corporate scandals after the case of 
Enron raised concerns about audit quality even 
among larger sized accounting firms, which are 
normally considered the premier accounting firms 
and associated with higher audit quality. Audit 
quality research has focused primarily on differences 
between larger-sized firms and smaller-sized firms 
(Chen et al., 2005).
The adequacy of auditors’ works to manage 
control force against earnings management has 
recently received much attention (Johl et al., 2007). 
The control forces are related to the effect of audit 
committee independence on the outside auditor 
choice, and on external auditor’s effectiveness and 
financial reporting quality (Ebrahim, 2007).
Earnings management is related to the size 
of the board of directors. This supports the view 
that larger boards appear to be ineffective in their 
oversight duties relative to the smaller boards. The 
relation between measures of earnings management 
and both institutional ownership in the firm and 
quality of its outside audit is assumed consistent and 
negative (Ebrahim, 2007; Rahman and Ali, 2006).
Auditors play a significant role in mitigating 
the earnings manipulative behavior. They found that 
earnings management is pervasive in the quarterly 
earnings numbers. For example, there are more 
zeros and fewer nines in the second digit of the ear-
nings number in each of the four quarters. Also, the 
earnings management in the fourth quarter, while 
still prominent, but is less as compared to each of 
the first three quarters (Guang et al., 2006).
The ability to manage earnings under the 
integral approach to interim reporting, however, 
decreases as the fiscal year progresses. The integral 
approach to quarterly financial reporting provides 
firms with more opportunity to manage earnings 
in the earlier quarters during any fiscal year. Since 
only the fourth quarter is audited, if the auditor 
was able to ensure that the firm complies with the 
requirements of the integral approach, the firm’s 
ability to engage in earnings would be diminished 
in the fourth fiscal quarter (Guang et al., 2006; Coté 
and Qi, 2005).
MATERIALITY IMPLICATIONS ON 
EARNINGS’ MANAGEMENT
The materiality concept influences accountants’ 
decision making, in particular decisions requiring 
estimations. The information considered immate-
rial by accountants is not reported to investors, 
creditors, and other users of financial statements. 
The stakeholders are aware of all public information 
(mandatory or non-mandatory information), and 
investors give attention to the released no-manda-
tory information (Watts and Zimmerman, 1986). 
The concept of materiality is simple but it is 
central in applying GAAP. FASB Concepts Statement 
No. 2, Qualitative Characteristics of Accounting 
Information (1980) defines materiality as follows:
 The magnitude of an omission or missta-
tement of accounting information that, 
in the light of surrounding circumstances, 
makes it probable that the judgment 
of a reasonable person relying on the 
information would have been changed 
or influenced by the omission or missta-
tement. (Para. 132)
Accounting authorities do not offer specific 
guide of materiality and less than 10 % of the 
pronouncements offer specific measurements of 
materiality. The economic factors are considered to 
determine the materiality of any issue. A rough cri-
terion of 5 % to 10 % of net income is an example of 
an adapted guideline of materiality by some CPAs 
(Patterson, 1967). Other basis of measures such 
as income trend or income growth has been used. 
Auditors usually use three quantitative measure-
ments, namely percentage effect on net income, 
percentage effect on total sales or total revenues, 
and percentage effect on total assets (Thompson, 
1993; Thompson et al., 1990; Kinney, 1986).
164
Finanz. polit. econ., ISSN 2248-6046, Vol. 6, No. 1, enero - junio, 2014, pp. 159 - 168 
Edición Especial - Economía Regional
Ahmad Hussein Juma’h
FASB ACCOUNTING STANDARD 
CODIFICATION™ 
The FASB Accounting Standards Codification™ 
Professional View (the Codification) provided by 
Financial Accounting Foundation (FAF) and the 
American Accounting Association (AAA) enable us 
to identify keywords related to materiality concept 
in accounting practices. To identify the materiality 
indications in the Codification, we use the ke-
ywords: materiality, importance and significance or 
some of these words derivations such as material, 
important, significant. From the listed codifications 
on the year 2010, only 95 indicate some implica-
tions of materiality. These are less than 10 % of the 
codifications (consistent with Thompson, et. al., 
1990). The following table summarizes the count 
and the percentage of each keyword.
Keyword Significance Importance Materiality Total
Count 58 16 21 95
Percentage 61 % 17 % 22 % 100 % 
The followings are examples of codifications 
that include materiality concept without guidelines 
or bases to determine the importance, significance 
or materiality of the discussed issues.
“… If continuing cash flows are generated, 
the determination as to whether those continuing 
cash flows are direct or indirect should be based on 
their nature and significance...” 205 Presentation of 
Financial Statements > 20 Discontinued Operations 
> 55 Implementation Guidance and Illustrations.
“... In view of the fact that policies listed 
under these items are fundamental policies which 
cannot be changed without prior shareholder ap-
proval, the importance of adopting a clear policy 
with regard to such investments is apparent. The 
prospectus of a registered investment company 
should also fully disclose the company’s policy with 
respect to restricted securities...” 946 Financial Ser-
vices - Investment Companies > 320 Investments 
- Debt and Equity Securities > S99 SEC Materials.
“...of an analysis of materiality; it cannot ap-
propriately be used as a substitute for a full analysis 
of all relevant considerations. Materiality concerns 
the significance of an item to users of a registrant’s 
financial statements. A matter is “material” if there 
is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable person 
would consider it important…” 250 Accounting 
Changes and Error Corrections > 10 Overall > S99 
SEC Materials.
Some codifications (e.g. 225, 310 and 323) 
explain the use of a percentage (e.g. 10 %) as gui-
delines or bases for the materiality determination.
“…The assessment of materiality is the 
responsibility of each registrant. However, absent 
concerns about trends or other qualitative consi-
derations, the staff generally will not insist on the 
reporting of income or loss applicable to common 
stock if the amount differs from net income or loss 
by less than ten percent…” 225 Income Statement 
> 10 Overall > S99 SEC Materials.
“…relating to properties underlying any 
loans … except that in the determination of sig-
nificance the 20 % disclosure threshold should be 
measured using total assets…” 310 Receivables > 
10 Overall > S99 SEC Materials.
“...significance tests of Rule 1-02(w)? Inter-
pretive Response: The 10 % measurement level of 
the significant subsidiary rule was not intended to 
establish a materiality criteria for omission, and the 
arbitrary exclusion of summarized information for 
selected entities up to a 10 % level is not appro-
priate...” 323 Investments—Equity Method and 
Joint Ventures > 10 Overall > S99 SEC Materials.
In rare cases the codifications indicate a 
specific percentage as a level of significance. The 
Code 944 explains the bases for the materiality of 
insurance with respect to inclusion as a note to 
financial statements. The Code 815 explains the use 
of a percentage (e.g. 5 % or 10 %) to indicate the 
level of significance in determining the materiality 
implications.
“…the amount of which is in excess of five 
percent of total liabilities. State in a note to the 
financial statements the relative significance of 
participating insurance expressed as percentages 
of (1) insurance in force and (2) premium income; 
and the method by which earnings and dividends 
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allocable to such insurance is determined…” 944 
Financial Services-Insurance > 210 Balance Sheet 
> S99 SEC Materials.
“…an entity shall evaluate, in part, the sig-
nificance of the estimated costs of converting the 
asset to cash in determining whether those assets 
are readily convertible to cash. 15-126 For purposes 
of assessing significance of such costs, an entity 
shall consider those estimated conversion costs to 
be significant only if they are 10 percent or more 
of the gross sales…” 815 Derivatives and Hedging 
> 10 Overall > 15 Scope and Scope Exceptions.
CONCLUSIONS
Accountants frequently use estimations to report 
financial results, conditions, and performance 
for their companies. The materiality concept is 
essential for any estimation in all decision making. 
The existence of information asymmetry between 
management and shareholders is a necessary con-
dition for earnings management. This is because 
shareholders cannot perfectly determine a firm’s 
performance and prospects in an environment 
in which they have less information than mana-
gement. In such an environment, management 
can use its flexibility to manage reported ear-
nings. Also, management’s discretionary ability 
to manage earnings increases as the information 
asymmetry between management and sharehol-
ders increases.
Based on agency theory, issues associated 
with the separation between ownership and 
control will lead managers (agents) to act in an 
opportunistic manner by increasing their personal 
wealth at the expense of the owners (principal) 
of an organization (Jensen and Mackling, 1976; 
Abdul and Haneem, 2006).
When managers are concentrated on the 
company’s goals and motivated toward achieving 
those goals, it is highly expected that the company 
achieve its goal. However if managers are working 
to achieve their own objectives and do not work 
to maximize companies wealth, the company is 
expected to have difficulties in achieving its goals. 
The internal factors and external factors 
related to the case context influence accountants’ 
views and perceptions. Examples of external fac-
tors include political, economic, and cultural issues 
that may influence the perception of accountants 
with respect to a decision making.
The internal factors are those under the 
individual’s control and external factors are con-
cerned to the situation and the individual may 
be force to act. This determination of the internal 
and external factors depend on three factors: 
1) distinctiveness where the individual act differently 
under different situations, 2) consensus is referred to 
the behavior of all individuals is the same way in the 
same situation, and 3) consistency referred to 
the behavior of an individual is the same over time 
for similar situations.
Rigorous regulations cannot completely re-
move earnings management from the market, but it 
can probably reduce it and provide explicit evidence 
for detecting and penalizing earnings management 
behaviors. The lack of a systematic framework of 
accounting standards brings many opportunities 
for earnings management (Noronha, et al., 2008).
Governance practices, especially independent 
boards and committees, effective management 
compensation, and powerful shareholders are 
important in constraining management from ma-
naging earnings and in ensuring a higher quality of 
earnings (Niu, 2006).
Accountants themselves, the users of financial 
accounting, generally accepted accounting princi-
ples, and the environment are the main factors that 
influence the perception of the preparers and the 
users of financial statements. 
In a turbulent political status, accountants 
may become more cautious than in a stable poli-
tical status. Accountants in a boom economy may 
perceive events in different way as in a recession 
economy. People in different cultures see things 
differently. Therefore, accountants depend on so-
mehow on their culture and the environment in 
which they work.
The complexity and the time required versus 
the time available to solve any issue are important 
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factors. Also, individuals involved and or related 
to the decision influence accountants in their 
works. Personal attitudes, motivations, interests, 
education, experience, and expectations are the 
main factors that influence the perception of ac-
countants, auditors, managers, and investors in 
considering the materiality of the relevance of an 
event or a transaction.
Auditors normally conduct most of their 
works judging others’ work. Therefore, auditors’ 
perception on the adequacy of accounting data is 
important. People in general selectively interpret 
what they see based on their interest, experience 
and attitudes. In the same way auditors perceive 
an event based on their interest, experience, edu-
cation. How auditors believe about an event may 
influence their decision about the adequacy of 
such event.
Also, how other auditors perceive such an 
event is important and influences the decision of 
auditors in evaluating a company’s data. Auditors 
may judge an event based on a single instance. 
For example if they found a material error in a 
transaction then they may decide to reevaluate the 
complete data. The type of organization and the 
industrial classification is another factor that may 
influence the decision of auditor in determining 
the materiality of an event.
In estimating the performance of companies’ 
units, the absence of clear materiality judgment 
perhaps enables accountants to decide differently 
on same materiality situation. The perception of 
the users of financial statements influences the 
perception and expectations of accountants and 
auditor in their decision making. Accountants may 
consider an event as immaterial because most 
investors consider the same event as immaterial.
Earnings management has been studied in 
a variety of contexts, for example compensation 
contract, debt covenants, seasoned equity and 
initial public offerings. Some accounting research 
has examined the relationship of different cor-
porate governance factors to different financial 
reporting issues. This includes financial reporting 
misstatements, fraud and earnings management 
(Dechow, et al., 1996; Ebrahim, 2007).
There is a scarcity to study the techniques 
used to manipulate companies’ accounts (Stolowy 
and Breton, 2003). Also, there is a need to study 
earning management in relation to corporate 
control contests (Ben-Amar and Missonier-Piera, 
2008) and it is important to realize more research 
with respect to application of materiality and its 
relation to earnings managements and accoun-
tants’ estimations for companies’ financial results 
and conditions.
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